Another aspect of flexibility in ia-bracketed relatives is the way that the coreferential NP is represented within the embedded relative clause. It appears never to be simply copied as a noun, though sometimes it is represented by a pronoun. In 1, e.g., meri 'girl' is represented by the pronoun em 'she' in the embedded sentence. Similarly, boi 'boy' in 2 is pronominalized to em 'he', and in 5 meri again becomes em. In 4, man 'man' is pronominalized to en 'he'. In the other four sentences, however, the head NP has no surface representation in the relative clause. Thus there is an alternation between pronominalization and deletion of the coreferential NP within the embedded sentence. This alternation occurs in virtually identical syntactic environments. Comparing sentences 2 and 3, e.g., we see that each begins with a subject noun (boi and pik 'pig' respectively); then follows an embedding in which something was done to the boy (or the pig)-i.e., each is the complement in the embedded sentence; finally, comes the predicate of the matrix sentence. In 2 however, boi is pronominalized to em in the embedded sentence, whereas in 3, pik has no surface representation at all in the embedded sentence. Sentences 5-6 present an even closer parallel. Said by the same speaker, only several minutes apart, and recounting two successive episodes in which two different groups of people were asked the same question, the sentences are virtually identical (in both cases meri is the complement of the matrix sentence and the subject of the embedded sentence)-except that in 5, meri is pronominalized to em in the embedded sentence, whereas in 6, it has been deleted altogether.
Exactly what constrains the alternation between pronominalization and deletion of the coreferential NP in the embedded sentence is not entirely clear. There are, however, several constraints about which we can be sure. First, when the head NP consists of a personal pronoun, deletion always seems to apply within the relative clause. There are, however, very few such sentences;6 in most, as in 1-8, the head NP consists of a noun, or a noun plus an adjective or a demonstrative like dispela 'this'. Hence this generalization is not very helpful in accounting for the variation we observe. A second constraint deals with the syntactic position of the coreferential NP within the embedded sentence. This has three parts, as follows:
(a) In OBLIQUE cases (after the 'prepositions' long and bilong),7 the relativized NP always appears as a pronoun, and is never deleted. An example of this with bilong (possessive) is provided in 4 above, where a more literal gloss of the embedded sentence would be 'the leg of his was injured'. An example with long (generalized locative, 'at, on, to') is: role (subject, object etc.) of the head NP in the subordinate clause' (171) include both pronominalization (though as we shall see, this is highly variable) and word order. Though case-marking is typical of noun coding languages, Tok Pisin (like most pidgins and, of course, many other languages) demonstrates almost no case-marking. Interestingly, however, one place where it does show up is precisely in the marking of oblique cases, where em (3rd person pronoun, unmarked for gender, and used everywhere except in oblique cases) becomes en after long and bilong. 6 One such sentence is cited as 67 below. Another aspect of flexibility in ia-bracketed relatives is the way that the coreferential NP is represented within the embedded relative clause. It appears never to be simply copied as a noun, though sometimes it is represented by a pronoun. In 1, e.g., meri 'girl' is represented by the pronoun em 'she' in the embedded sentence. Similarly, boi 'boy' in 2 is pronominalized to em 'he', and in 5 meri again becomes em. In 4, man 'man' is pronominalized to en 'he'. In the other four sentences, however, the head NP has no surface representation in the relative clause. Thus there is an alternation between pronominalization and deletion of the coreferential NP within the embedded sentence. This alternation occurs in virtually identical syntactic environments. Comparing sentences 2 and 3, e.g., we see that each begins with a subject noun (boi and pik 'pig' respectively); then follows an embedding in which something was done to the boy (or the pig)-i.e., each is the complement in the embedded sentence; finally, comes the predicate of the matrix sentence. In 2 however, boi is pronominalized to em in the embedded sentence, whereas in 3, pik has no surface representation at all in the embedded sentence. Sentences 5-6 present an even closer parallel. Said by the same speaker, only several minutes apart, and recounting two successive episodes in which two different groups of people were asked the same question, the sentences are virtually identical (in both cases meri is the complement of the matrix sentence and the subject of the embedded sentence)-except that in 5, meri is pronominalized to em in the embedded sentence, whereas in 6, it has been deleted altogether.
(a) In OBLIQUE cases (after the 'prepositions' long and bilong),7 the relativized NP always appears as a pronoun, and is never deleted. An example of this with bilong (possessive) is provided in 4 above, where a more literal gloss of the embedded sentence would be 'the leg of his was injured'. An example with long (generalized locative, 'at, on, to') is:
(a) In OBLIQUE cases (after the 'prepositions' long and bilong),7 the relativized NP always appears as a pronoun, and is never deleted. An example of this with bilong (possessive) is provided in 4 above, where a more literal gloss of the embedded sentence would be 'the leg of his was injured'. An example with long (generalized locative, 'at, on, to') is: (iii) N thats [... PRO ...] Noting that the element represented as that 'is not case-inflected and cannot be the object of a preposition', Schwartz adds: 'Type (iii) is only a variant of (ii), in that (iii) allows the accusative pronoun to surface, although it may be optionally suppressed. Both types allow the more oblique cases to be relativizable as surface pronouns, e.g. the house that we live in-it.' As we have shown above, Tok Pisin also allows the subject pronoun to surface, a possibility not discussed by Schwartz. Indeed, surface subject pronouns are more common in relative clauses than accusative pronouns.9 Surface pronouns are obligatory in oblique cases.
Where there is a surface pronoun in the embedded sentence, there appear to be no movement rules which would re-order constituents differently from their normal order in non-subordinate sentences. Thus there is no evidence of a rule which would demonstrate a principle of pronoun attraction (cf. Givon 1972); and we have only one sentence (13 below) which might serve as a possible candidate for pied-piping :114)-an attempt which failed, as the speaker hesitated and reverted to normal order.
Another area of variation in the structuring of embedded relative clauses involves those cases in which the matrix sentence continues after the embedding. Since 9 The fact that it is predominantly subject pronouns which 'surface' has prompted Susan Steele (personal communication) to raise the question of whether there is normally a pronoun copy or clitic in simplex sentences of the form Tispela SKIN EM i bilong kapul (Laycock 1970a:24 ) 'This skin is a possum skin.' Indeed, there are many such sentences; but there are also many sentences of the form Tispela BANIS i bilong gaten bilong mi (Laycock 1970a:25) 'This fence belongs to my garden. ' We find such pairs in equational sentences as well as in sentences with various verb types (cf. also the contrast between 52 and 53 below); and the constraints on pronoun copying in simplex sentences are at present far from obvious.
(9) Yu lukim DISPELA ia [kon ia wantaim muruk isanap long EN ia]?
(Emma M.) 'Did you see THIS ONE [THAT has corn and cassowaries on IT]?' Since prepositions cannot be stranded, there is no analog to the English 'Did you see the one that they put the design on?' (b) In cases of COMPLEMENTS, the relativized NP very rarely appears as a pronoun, but is almost always deleted (in a ratio of about 4:1), as in 3 above. But there are a few cases where, as in 2, complements remain as pronouns in embedded relative clauses. In any case, there is a general rule which deletes complements of transitive verbs in a great many contexts (cf. . Thus the fact that very few accusative pronouns show up in relatives is not chiefly the result of any rule specific to relativization.8 (c) It is where the coreferential NP occurs as the SUBJECT of the embedded sentence that we find the greatest variation. Here, too, the tendency is to delete rather than pronominalize, but in a ratio of only about 2:1.
The Tok Pisin sentences thus represent two of the syntactic variants sketched by Schwartz 1971, namely his types (ii) and (iii), schematized (p. 142) as follows: (iii) N thats [... PRO ...] Noting that the element represented as that 'is not case-inflected and cannot be the object of a preposition', Schwartz adds: 'Type (iii) is only a variant of (ii), in that (iii) allows the accusative pronoun to surface, although it may be optionally suppressed. Both types allow the more oblique cases to be relativizable as surface pronouns, e.g. the house that we live in-it.' As we have shown above, Tok Pisin also allows the subject pronoun to surface, a possibility not discussed by Schwartz. Indeed, surface subject pronouns are more common in relative clauses than accusative pronouns.9 Surface pronouns are obligatory in oblique cases.
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Tok Pisin is an SVO language, these sentences are, for the most part, those in which the head noun is the subject of the matrix sentence-as in 1-4 above, where the embedded relative is followed at least by the verb of the matrix sentence. Of the 49 such sentences in our corpus, 33 (67%) are like 1, 2, and 4, in that the coreferential NP is again represented after the embedding, as a pronoun. 'Literal' glosses for these sentences would be as follows:
( 1 has come to work here."' Both sentences lack the initial ia-bracket, and 11 is also interpretable as a conditional, glossed something like: 'If a girl really succeeds, really knows, she'll get a certificate and become a nurse.' Both of these matters will be discussed in ?8 below, where we shall see that the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of coreferential NP's is also related to aspects of the information structure of the discourse.
In summary, we have seen that the basic process used in relativization is the placement of ia at the beginning and end of the embedded clause, and that this device is used independently of whether head nouns and coreferential NP's are in subject, complement, or oblique positions. Within the embedded clause, the Tok Pisin is an SVO language, these sentences are, for the most part, those in which the head noun is the subject of the matrix sentence-as in 1-4 above, where the embedded relative is followed at least by the verb of the matrix sentence. Of the 49 such sentences in our corpus, 33 (67%) are like 1, 2, and 4, in that the coreferential NP is again represented after the embedding, as a pronoun. 'Literal' glosses for these sentences would be as follows:
In summary, we have seen that the basic process used in relativization is the placement of ia at the beginning and end of the embedded clause, and that this device is used independently of whether head nouns and coreferential NP's are in subject, complement, or oblique positions. Within the embedded clause, the relativized NP may either be represented as a pronoun or deleted, and there are some syntactic constraints involved in this variation. Where the matrix sentence continues after the embedding, the head noun tends once more to be represented as a pronoun; but again it is often deleted, and there is a great deal of variation here too. Where Equi-NP Deletion has occurred within the embedding, a coreferential pronoun is slightly more likely to occur again after it than not (19 occurrences and 14 non-occurrences). The presence of such a pronoun within the embedding, however, makes it very likely that another will also occur after the embedding (14 occurrences vs. 2 non-occurrences).
OTHER POSSIBLE DEVICES FOR RELATIVIZATION. We shall now consider whether
all relative clauses in Tok Pisin are constructed in this way, and whether any other mechanisms are used in relativization. Indeed, not all relative clauses are bracketed on both sides by ia-as we have already seen in 11-12, where ia marks only the end of the embedded relative. In other cases, ia marks only the beginning of the embedding; and in still others, ia-brackets are missing entirely. An attempt to describe and explain these phenomena will, however, have to await a discussion of the broader functions of ia-bracketing in discourse.
As far as other markers of relativization are concerned, it is important to note the role of intonation. Many embedded relatives end on a rising intonation contour, as will be examined in greater detail in ?5.
Another possible type of marker is WH-forms-a set of obvious candidates for relativizers in any language, given the relation between relatives and indirect questions as discussed, e.g., in an important paper by . In Tok Pisin, these are we 'where', husat 'who', and wonem 'what'. In all the complex sentences we have examined, only five use WH. In 13, there is hesitation as the speaker first tries long,10 then we, and then finishes off the relative with a righthand ia-bracket: 10 Had long not been replaced by we in this sentence, it would probably have been followed by the pronoun en (given the impossibility of preposition stranding), yielding something like ' at it the pig slept'. But this possible attempt at pied piping seems to have failed, in that the speaker replaced long by we, and then inserted long en ('at it') in its normal, postverbal position. However, since long also serves as a complementizer, its use here (and in 17, below) may have been as an intended subordinator rather than a preposition. Both sentences involve considerable hesitation on the speaker's part. A third possibility is that long represents an aborted attempt to introduce an indirect object: soim ples long X 'pointed out the place to X'. relativized NP may either be represented as a pronoun or deleted, and there are some syntactic constraints involved in this variation. Where the matrix sentence continues after the embedding, the head noun tends once more to be represented as a pronoun; but again it is often deleted, and there is a great deal of variation here too. Where Equi-NP Deletion has occurred within the embedding, a coreferential pronoun is slightly more likely to occur again after it than not (19 occurrences and 14 non-occurrences). The presence of such a pronoun within the embedding, however, makes it very likely that another will also occur after the embedding (14 occurrences vs. 2 non-occurrences).
OTHER POSSIBLE DEVICES FOR RELATIVIZATION.
We shall now consider whether all relative clauses in Tok Pisin are constructed in this way, and whether any other mechanisms are used in relativization. Indeed, not all relative clauses are bracketed on both sides by ia-as we have already seen in 11-12, where ia marks only the end of the embedded relative. In other cases, ia marks only the beginning of the embedding; and in still others, ia-brackets are missing entirely. An attempt to describe and explain these phenomena will, however, have to await a discussion of the broader functions of ia-bracketing in discourse.
Another possible type of marker is WH-forms-a set of obvious candidates for relativizers in any language, given the relation between relatives and indirect questions as discussed, e.g., in an important paper by . In Tok Pisin, these are we 'where', husat 'who', and wonem 'what'. In all the complex sentences we have examined, only five use WH. In 13, there is hesitation as the speaker first tries long,10 then we, and then finishes off the relative with a righthand ia-bracket: 10 Had long not been replaced by we in this sentence, it would probably have been followed by the pronoun en (given the impossibility of preposition stranding), yielding something like ' at it the pig slept'. But this possible attempt at pied piping seems to have failed, in that the speaker replaced long by we, and then inserted long en ('at it') in its normal, postverbal position. However, since long also serves as a complementizer, its use here (and in 17, below) may have been as an intended subordinator rather than a preposition. Both sentences involve considerable hesitation on the speaker's part. A third possibility is that long represents an aborted attempt to introduce an indirect object: soim ples long X 'pointed out the place to X'. .' The paucity of sentences in our corpus using various forms of WH in the syntax of complex sentences does not, however, indicate the absence of such constructions in Tok Pisin. Indeed, in the Manus District, Peter Miihlhausler (personal communication) has heard we used as a relativizer in sentences other than relatives of place.1" Nevertheless, in the Tok Pisin familiar to us, the only common use of WH in complex syntax is in indirect questions such as 14. Though we do not treat indirect questions in this paper, our general impression is that ia-bracketing is not used in these constructions, and that WH is widely used. Cleft sentences, however, group with the relatives in using ia-bracketing, and we will turn briefly to a consideration of them.
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3. CLEFT SENTENCES. Keenan & Hull's study of relative clauses, cleft sentences, and wH-questions in approximately a dozen languages sets forth a number of reasons why the syntax of the three constructions should present so many similarities. In addition, they find 'a general tendency, on points where all three construc-11 In our data, we is not used even in the formation of place relatives, the only case we have being 13. Miihlhausler (personal communication) reports that his data for 'those speakers who use we as a relative pronoun suggest that left-hand ya never appears but that right-hand ya is occasionally present.' Nevertheless, 'ya is strongly present in the speech of young people on the New Guinea mainland, particularly strong in the case of those who speak Tok Pisin as their first language.' Muhlhausler also cites data gathered by Malcolm Ross in a high-school class of students from various parts of Papua New Guinea, for whom ia was consistently used in forming relative clauses: 'The left-hand ia was consistently present, the right-hand one sometimes missing when it fell at the end of a sentence. .' The paucity of sentences in our corpus using various forms of WH in the syntax of complex sentences does not, however, indicate the absence of such constructions in Tok Pisin. Indeed, in the Manus District, Peter Miihlhausler (personal communication) has heard we used as a relativizer in sentences other than relatives of place.1" Nevertheless, in the Tok Pisin familiar to us, the only common use of WH in complex syntax is in indirect questions such as 14. Though we do not treat indirect questions in this paper, our general impression is that ia-bracketing is not used in these constructions, and that WH is widely used. Cleft sentences, however, group with the relatives in using ia-bracketing, and we will turn briefly to a consideration of them.
3. CLEFT SENTENCES. Keenan & Hull's study of relative clauses, cleft sentences, and wH-questions in approximately a dozen languages sets forth a number of reasons why the syntax of the three constructions should present so many similarities. In addition, they find 'a general tendency, on points where all three construc-11 In our data, we is not used even in the formation of place relatives, the only case we have being 13. Miihlhausler (personal communication) reports that his data for 'those speakers who use we as a relative pronoun suggest that left-hand ya never appears but that right-hand ya is occasionally present.' Nevertheless, 'ya is strongly present in the speech of young people on the New Guinea mainland, particularly strong in the case of those who speak Tok Pisin as their first language.' Muhlhausler also cites data gathered by Malcolm Ross in a high-school class of students from various parts of Papua New Guinea, for whom ia was consistently used in forming relative clauses: 'The left-hand ia was consistently present, the right-hand one sometimes missing when it fell at the end of a sentence. .' The paucity of sentences in our corpus using various forms of WH in the syntax of complex sentences does not, however, indicate the absence of such constructions in Tok Pisin. Indeed, in the Manus District, Peter Miihlhausler (personal communication) has heard we used as a relativizer in sentences other than relatives of place.1" Nevertheless, in the Tok Pisin familiar to us, the only common use of WH in complex syntax is in indirect questions such as 14. Though we do not treat indirect questions in this paper, our general impression is that ia-bracketing is not used in these constructions, and that WH is widely used. Cleft sentences, however, group with the relatives in using ia-bracketing, and we will turn briefly to a consideration of them. and wH-questions in approximately a dozen languages sets forth a number of reasons why the syntax of the three constructions should present so many similarities. In addition, they find 'a general tendency, on points where all three construc-11 In our data, we is not used even in the formation of place relatives, the only case we have being 13. Miihlhausler (personal communication) reports that his data for 'those speakers who use we as a relative pronoun suggest that left-hand ya never appears but that right-hand ya is occasionally present.' Nevertheless, 'ya is strongly present in the speech of young people on the New Guinea mainland, particularly strong in the case of those who speak Tok Pisin as their first language.' Muhlhausler also cites data gathered by Malcolm Ross in a high-school class of students from various parts of Papua New Guinea, for whom ia was consistently used in forming relative clauses: 'The left-hand ia was consistently present, the right-hand one sometimes missing when it fell at the end of a sentence. .' The paucity of sentences in our corpus using various forms of WH in the syntax of complex sentences does not, however, indicate the absence of such constructions in Tok Pisin. Indeed, in the Manus District, Peter Miihlhausler (personal communication) has heard we used as a relativizer in sentences other than relatives of place.1" Nevertheless, in the Tok Pisin familiar to us, the only common use of WH in complex syntax is in indirect questions such as 14. Though we do not treat indirect questions in this paper, our general impression is that ia-bracketing is not used in these constructions, and that WH is widely used. Cleft sentences, however, group with the relatives in using ia-bracketing, and we will turn briefly to a consideration of them.
3. CLEFT SENTENCES. Keenan & Hull's study of relative clauses, cleft sentences, and wH-questions in approximately a dozen languages sets forth a number of reasons why the syntax of the three constructions should present so many similarities. In addition, they find 'a general tendency, on points where all three construc-11 In our data, we is not used even in the formation of place relatives, the only case we have being 13. Miihlhausler (personal communication) reports that his data for 'those speakers who use we as a relative pronoun suggest that left-hand ya never appears but that right-hand ya is occasionally present.' Nevertheless, 'ya is strongly present in the speech of young people on the New Guinea mainland, particularly strong in the case of those who speak Tok Pisin as their first language.' Muhlhausler also cites data gathered by Malcolm Ross in a high-school class of students from various parts of Papua New Guinea, for whom ia was consistently used in forming relative clauses: 'The left-hand ia was consistently present, the right-hand one sometimes missing when it fell at the end of a sentence. But it is as a demonstrative or deictic marker that ia abounds in our data. It seems only a short step to extend the function of a lexical item that has served as an adverb of place to a demonstrative or generalized deictic function. At least, this is a phenomenon common to many languages; cf. Eng. this here man, which retains a non-standard connotation, or Fr. celui-ci and celui-ld ('this one' and 'that one' in standard French, from the adverbs ici and la respectively). We should point out that, although the argument in this paragraph assumes a 'place adverbial' origin, with an extension to broader demonstrative or deictic functions (an argument which appears to have historical support in this case, as we shall demonstrate in ?9), the fact that the two functions are expressed by the same form on the synchronic level, in Tok Pisin as in many other languages, is understandable in terms of the close semantic analogy between the two uses, without assuming any directionality.
We have many sentences in our data like 23-24, in which ia is postposed to a noun or pronoun and has the function of focusing on that element. Sometimes it marks contrast with some other referent-'this (here) N,13 rather than some other'; but sometimes it simply foregrounds the N. In 25, e.g., the speaker is function 'emphatically' or demonstratively except in combination with personal pronouns, in which case it PRECEDES the pronoun. Pawley states (1972:36): 'The focal pronouns ... are used when the speaker wishes to focus on or emphasize the pronoun ... They act as emphatic or redundant subject, preceding the unemphatic subjective pronouns.' Despite this-and despite the fact that Tolai, the major Austronesian language contributing to Tok Pisin, also uses ia as one form of the 3sg. pronoun :11)-Tok Pisin ia clearly does not have its origin in a personal pronoun, even a 'focusing' pronoun. Rather, as will be explained in ?9, the more important parallel with Austronesian languages concerns the POSTPOSED deictic marker found in a number of the Austronesian languages of Melanesia. But it is as a demonstrative or deictic marker that ia abounds in our data. It seems only a short step to extend the function of a lexical item that has served as an adverb of place to a demonstrative or generalized deictic function. At least, this is a phenomenon common to many languages; cf. Eng. this here man, which retains a non-standard connotation, or Fr. celui-ci and celui-ld ('this one' and 'that one' in standard French, from the adverbs ici and la respectively). We should point out that, although the argument in this paragraph assumes a 'place adverbial' origin, with an extension to broader demonstrative or deictic functions (an argument which appears to have historical support in this case, as we shall demonstrate in ?9), the fact that the two functions are expressed by the same form on the synchronic level, in Tok Pisin as in many other languages, is understandable in terms of the close semantic analogy between the two uses, without assuming any directionality.
We have many sentences in our data like 23-24, in which ia is postposed to a noun or pronoun and has the function of focusing on that element. Sometimes it marks contrast with some other referent-'this (here) N,13 rather than some other'; but sometimes it simply foregrounds the N. In 25, e.g., the speaker is function 'emphatically' or demonstratively except in combination with personal pronouns, in which case it PRECEDES the pronoun. Pawley states (1972:36): 'The focal pronouns ... are used when the speaker wishes to focus on or emphasize the pronoun ... They act as emphatic or redundant subject, preceding the unemphatic subjective pronouns.' Despite this-and despite the fact that Tolai, the major Austronesian language contributing to Tok Pisin, also uses ia as one form of the 3sg. pronoun :11)-Tok Pisin ia clearly does not have its origin in a personal pronoun, even a 'focusing' pronoun. Rather, as will be explained in ?9, the more important parallel with Austronesian languages concerns the POSTPOSED deictic marker found in a number of the Austronesian languages of Melanesia. 'But all sorts of other people, they're simply incapable of it!' (of speaking Tok Pisin well, in contrast to the speaker and her friends). asking a friend of hers about the price of a certain type of cloth the friend has bought. She says to her, pointing to the cloth in question, (25) Disfela ia, ol ikosim em haumas? (Lita T.) 'This one, how much do they charge for it?' la in deixis is sometimes best glossed as 'this' or 'that' (cf. Rickford 1973:17),14 sometimes as the weaker 'the'. But note that the distribution of ia (alternating with 0) probably does not correspond in any neat way with the distribution of this, the, and a in English, certainly not with respect to the complexities of colloquial usage exemplified in sentences such as So we ran into this friend of hers. (Indeed, it will soon become apparent that the sentence is a very inappropriate unit for the analysis and understanding of these issues, and can therefore exemplify very little.) Like Eng. this, however, ia can be attached either to a FIRST reference to a particular item in some discourse, or to a LATER reference to an item which has previously been mentioned. What is common to both cases is that, in saying N ia 'THIS one', the speaker uses a form that invites the addressee to recognize or uniquely identify the referent. Such recognition or identification may be accomplished in several ways.15 First, there may be a gestural or non-linguistic accompaniment to the speech act itself, occurring at the same time or in close proximity to it, which makes very clear the referent of the word to which ia has been attachede.g., Lita's pointing to the cloth in 25. Another case would be someone's asking, immediately after a very loud noise has visibly startled everyone present, Em wonem ia? 'What was that?', where 'that' clearly refers to the noise-or an even more laconic Balus ia, literally, 'This/That airplane', but understood by everyone under the circumstances to mean 'This/That noise was caused by an airplane.' Second, the attaching of ia to some N (in the absence of concurrent non-linguistic indication of the referent of N) may in itself be sufficient for the identification of its specific referent. This may be either because the referent has been specified earlier in the discourse (in the case of later references), or because of information shared by speakers and hearers prior to this interchange (in the case of first references). In both cases, talking about speakers and hearers' accomplishing' identification may seem to be putting the case somewhat strongly. Nevertheless, the issues here clearly deal with identification, whether or not there is any problem about the actual task of identification which a particular speaker or hearer has in a given case. For example, 26 is drawn from a long narrative about a whole community of people from a seaside village fleeing to the hills in fear of a tidal wave, expected to follow an earthquake foretold by a prophet:
(26) Na ol igo istap long MAUNTEN ia na wet long bikpela GURIA ia igo (Noemi S.) 'And they went and stayed on this MOUNTAIN and waited for this big EARTHQUAKE.' 14 Rickford also points out that ia can mean 'both "this one here" and "that one there" or both "the former" and "the latter".' We thank him also for helpful discussion of many of the problems of deictic ia.
15 Our use of the term 'identification' corresponds rather closely to Sacks & Schegloff's (MS) use of 'recognition'; i.e., the issues involve recognition of a specific, known referent. It is also very similar to the use of 'attribution' in Goffman (MS), which involves recognizing which specific one of a known set is being referred to, where the referent refers hearers back to some schema of identification they are known (or believed) to have. asking a friend of hers about the price of a certain type of cloth the friend has bought. She says to her, pointing to the cloth in question, (25) Disfela ia, ol ikosim em haumas? (Lita T.) 'This one, how much do they charge for it?' la in deixis is sometimes best glossed as 'this' or 'that' (cf. Rickford 1973:17),14 sometimes as the weaker 'the'. But note that the distribution of ia (alternating with 0) probably does not correspond in any neat way with the distribution of this, the, and a in English, certainly not with respect to the complexities of colloquial usage exemplified in sentences such as So we ran into this friend of hers. (Indeed, it will soon become apparent that the sentence is a very inappropriate unit for the analysis and understanding of these issues, and can therefore exemplify very little.) Like Eng. this, however, ia can be attached either to a FIRST reference to a particular item in some discourse, or to a LATER reference to an item which has previously been mentioned. What is common to both cases is that, in saying N ia 'THIS one', the speaker uses a form that invites the addressee to recognize or uniquely identify the referent. Such recognition or identification may be accomplished in several ways.15 First, there may be a gestural or non-linguistic accompaniment to the speech act itself, occurring at the same time or in close proximity to it, which makes very clear the referent of the word to which ia has been attachede.g., Lita's pointing to the cloth in 25. Another case would be someone's asking, immediately after a very loud noise has visibly startled everyone present, Em wonem ia? 'What was that?', where 'that' clearly refers to the noise-or an even more laconic Balus ia, literally, 'This/That airplane', but understood by everyone under the circumstances to mean 'This/That noise was caused by an airplane.' Second, the attaching of ia to some N (in the absence of concurrent non-linguistic indication of the referent of N) may in itself be sufficient for the identification of its specific referent. This may be either because the referent has been specified earlier in the discourse (in the case of later references), or because of information shared by speakers and hearers prior to this interchange (in the case of first references). In both cases, talking about speakers and hearers' accomplishing' identification may seem to be putting the case somewhat strongly. Nevertheless, the issues here clearly deal with identification, whether or not there is any problem about the actual task of identification which a particular speaker or hearer has in a given case. For example, 26 is drawn from a long narrative about a whole community of people from a seaside village fleeing to the hills in fear of a tidal wave, expected to follow an earthquake foretold by a prophet:
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(26) Na ol igo istap long MAUNTEN ia na wet long bikpela GURIA ia igo (Noemi S.) 'And they went and stayed on this MOUNTAIN and waited for this big EARTHQUAKE.'
THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE
The mountain (maunten) in question and the impending earthquake (guria) have already been discussed in some detail by the narrator; references to them here are subsequent references. There is no problem in distinguishing this particular mountain and earthquake from some other possible candidates. In specifying maunten ia and guria ia, the narrator is alerting the listener to the fact that she has already been told 'which mountain' and 'which earthquake'. Another example is taken from a narrative where the protagonists are two women, the meri tru 'real woman' and the tevel meri 'spirit woman'. The sentence starts by twice referring to them jointly with the dual pronoun tupela; the next reference is to only one of them, the meri tru, which is qualified by ia and refers back to a prior characterization: (27) TUPELA igo, igo kisim kanu na TUPELA igo, igo igo nau, na MERI TRU ia em iwo-huk. EM iwok long pulim pis na level meri iwok long kaikai pis (John P.) 'The two of them went and got a canoe and the two of them went off, and the REAL WOMAN was-fishing. SHE was busy fishing and the spirit woman was busy eating the fish.' The problem of identification appears fairly simple in narratives, where an item tagged with ia has generally been introduced and characterized earlier, as with maunten, guria, and meri tru in 26-27. In hundreds of cases like these, neither speakers nor hearers appear to encounter any problem in achieving mutual understanding of the correct referents of N's to which ia's are attached. Indeed, speakers and hearers seem able to communicate correct identifications in many potentially more difficult situations than those of 26-27, e.g. where the N in question has not previously been mentioned, as in 28. Here the speaker has been engaged in an abstract discussion of the nature of a type of spirit creature known as masalai 'incubus'. 'A masalai can turn itself into human form,' he has been explaining, 'in order to seduce you. You may just sit down and have a chat with it, thinking it's a real person. But it's invisible to everyone else; only you can see it. So if I were to come along and find you talking to one, I wouldn't be able to see it, and I'd exclaim:
(28) E! MAN ia toktok wantaim husat ?!' (Tony T.) 'Hey! Who's this GUY talking to?!' Man ia is clearly the person who has up to now been referred to as 'you', the hypothetical character the masalai has been trying to seduce; and Tony's exclamation is addressed to some hypothetical third party. Though man in 28 was technically being used for the first time in the discourse in question, the identification of its referent was not problematic for any of the hearers.
Despite the fact that no problems of identification in fact occurred in 25-28, it is nevertheless the case that saying N ia 'THIS N' opens the door to the potential 'identificational' query, 'Which N?'16 Though on many occasions speakers in 16 Various observers have differed in their interpretations of just how problematic the identification of the N qualified by ia is. Thus Wurm states (12): ' Hia and lohap ... are also used alone after nouns ... This is done when the object referred to has been mentioned before, or the person spoken to is familiar with it, or no doubt is expected to arise over what it is. The use of these postposed demonstratives carries the connotation of stressing the obvious, and the purely demonstrative function is sometimes quite weak, e.g. mi hanggiri long mit hia: I am hungry for tinned meat (i.e. it should be obvious that I do not hunger for sweet potatoes. ' Rickford, on the other hand, says (3): 'la seems to be used in just those cases where doubt
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second ia-a feature which will be discussed later). All have the characteristic, rising, 'comma' intonation marking the expression inserted after the first N ia.
In 25-28, the referents of items qualified by ia are fairly obvious, whether because of the immediate non-linguistic circumstances of the discourse, or because ia tags something whose referent had previously been made clear, or was correctly identifiable by hearers because of knowledge or understanding they had. In such sentences, ia can be seen as somehow backward-looking; it alerts listeners to the fact that they are supposed to know 'which N'. But 29-31 and 4 mark a subtle shift. Though ia is still 'backward-looking' in the same sense, we see that the first N chosen and tagged with ia may not be felicitous (it may be inadequate for correct identification of the referent by hearers, or it may not be an identification appropriate for use in the immediate context).17 Once there is any doubt about the referent of an item tagged by ia, a speaker may make another try at providing an identification. The most likely place to correct a potential trouble (e.g. misidentification of the correct referent) is immediately after the possibility of trouble has occurred, i.e. after the first N tagged by ia; hence ia becomes, in effect, the potential marker of a place where another try at identification may be made. Thus in 29, boi, a generic term whose referent (even in the context) might have been any of the three brothers, is replaced by Dasti, the name of the specific referent; in 30, a new term used to refer to the spirit-person, tamberan, is replaced by the only term which has previously been used for this referent in this discourse, masalai.
However, as we saw by comparing the function of the bracketed material in 31 and 4 with that in 29-30, such one-word re-identifications are but the simplest type of a class of expressions that can be inserted parenthetically after ia, and whose function is identificational. As the marker of the beginning of a parenthetical expression of some sort,'8 ia can be conceived as a left-hand or initial bracket. Indeed, this was the function of ia occurring after the head NP in the relative clauses of ?1, and after the focused noun in the cleft sentences of ?3.
An extension of this 'identificational' use of the slot after ia occurs in more clearcut cases of 'correction' than in the simple replacement of a term by a more precise one, or by a descriptive phrase;19 and this provides a second type of evidence for our argument that problems of identification can occur, and that they are often repaired immediately after the first instance of N ia. Speakers, e.g., in replacing one term with another, may admit the first was an 'error' by saying something like 'whoops', 'sorry', or 'I mean', any of which could serve as a gloss for wonem (literally, 'what') in the following:
(32) Tupela ikam long dispela KAR ia,-wonem, HOS ia! (Diane G.) 'The two of them came in this CAR,-uh, on a HORSE!' 17 Cf. the discussion of these issues in Schegloff 1972. 18 Our use of the term 'parenthetical expression' will be restricted to relative clauses (both restrictive and non-restrictive) and to other appositive expressions which relate informationally to some N in the matrix sentence. We do not mean it in Emonds' sense (1973:335) of 'parenthetical clauses' which specifically do NOT 'dominate a phrase node (such as NP)', but rather refer to, or comment on, a whole independent clause. 19 We do not mean to imply that ALL 'correction' in Tok Pisin requires the use of ia, but simply that its existence provides one important mechanism for certain types of correction. second ia-a feature which will be discussed later). All have the characteristic, rising, 'comma' intonation marking the expression inserted after the first N ia.
(32) Tupela ikam long dispela KAR ia,-wonem, HOS ia! (Diane G.) 'The two of them came in this CAR,-uh, on a HORSE!' second ia-a feature which will be discussed later). All have the characteristic, rising, 'comma' intonation marking the expression inserted after the first N ia. In 25-28, the referents of items qualified by ia are fairly obvious, whether because of the immediate non-linguistic circumstances of the discourse, or because ia tags something whose referent had previously been made clear, or was correctly identifiable by hearers because of knowledge or understanding they had. In such sentences, ia can be seen as somehow backward-looking; it alerts listeners to the fact that they are supposed to know 'which N'. But 29-31 and 4 mark a subtle shift. Though ia is still 'backward-looking' in the same sense, we see that the first N chosen and tagged with ia may not be felicitous (it may be inadequate for correct identification of the referent by hearers, or it may not be an identification appropriate for use in the immediate context).17 Once there is any doubt about the referent of an item tagged by ia, a speaker may make another try at providing an identification. The most likely place to correct a potential trouble (e.g. misidentification of the correct referent) is immediately after the possibility of trouble has occurred, i.e. after the first N tagged by ia; hence ia becomes, in effect, the potential marker of a place where another try at identification may be made. Thus in 29, boi, a generic term whose referent (even in the context) might have been any of the three brothers, is replaced by Dasti, the name of the specific referent; in 30, a new term used to refer to the spirit-person, tamberan, is replaced by the only term which has previously been used for this referent in this discourse, masalai.
An extension of this 'identificational' use of the slot after ia occurs in more clearcut cases of 'correction' than in the simple replacement of a term by a more precise one, or by a descriptive phrase;19 and this provides a second type of evidence for our argument that problems of identification can occur, and that they are often repaired immediately after the first instance of N ia. Speakers, e.g., in replacing one term with another, may admit the first was an 'error' by saying something like 'whoops', 'sorry', or 'I mean', any of which could serve as a gloss for wonem ( First, however, we must return to the notion of ia as a left-hand or initial bracket, introduced in the discussion of examples 29 ff. As we noted, these examples all involved 'backward-looking' use of the slot after ia, inserting information designed to identify 'which N'. But a deictic marker which has become a potential initial bracket for a parenthetical expression provides another important structural possibility, viz. the 'forward-looking' use of the slot for the insertion of 'new' information. Thus, in using the expression N ia about an item mentioned for the first time, about which hearers may have no prior knowledge, a speaker can use the slot provided after ia to supply a description or CHARACTERIZATION, rather than an IDENTIFICATION. He is thus saying, in effect, 'this N' (about which I am going to tell you something relevant) instead of 'this N' (which you are supposed to know about). That is, IDENTIFICATIONS instruct hearers, ' Search in your file to see which one this is'; CHARACTERIZATIONS instruct them, 'Open a file on this N, and put this information in it. ' The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below:
(33) Nau ol igo long solwara tu na lukim stik bilong SAMAN ia, yes, KANU ia (Donald D.) 'So they went down to the sea and saw the pole of the OUTRIGGER, yes, the CANOE.' A third type of evidence for the use of ia in problems of identification comes from cases where the first N tagged by ia is not a noun at all, but one of the very general pro-forms typified by the interrogatives wonem and husat, which are glossed in English by words like whatchamacallit, whosis, thingamabob, whatsisname etc. These are used in 'word-searches'-e.g. in 17 above, where the pro-form was husat. Three examples using wonem are cited as 34-36. This usage is very frequent, particularly among children (all the cited examples come from the speech of children and adolescents):
(34) Na em isingautim olgeta, WONEM ia, MAN long ples bilong kam luk sanap na lukluk (Elena Z.) 'And she called out to all the UH, PEOPLE from the village to come and see, stand up and look.' (35) Na disfela seken pikinini ia bai em igo long wanpela bikpela WONEM ia, TA UN stret na bai em iwok (Celia D.) 'And this second child will go to a big THING, a real TOWN and he'll work (there).' (36) 01 ikilim disfela WONEM ia, MERI ia (Paul T.) 'They killed this THING, this WOMAN.' A fourth kind of evidence of the potentially problematic nature of identifications comes from sequences where speakers other than the one who has said N ia are involved in confirming, questioning, and adding to identifications. This evidence will be presented in ?5.
First, however, we must return to the notion of ia as a left-hand or initial bracket, introduced in the discussion of examples 29 ff. As we noted, these examples all involved 'backward-looking' use of the slot after ia, inserting information designed to identify 'which N'. But a deictic marker which has become a potential initial bracket for a parenthetical expression provides another important structural possibility, viz. the 'forward-looking' use of the slot for the insertion of 'new' information. Thus, in using the expression N ia about an item mentioned for the first time, about which hearers may have no prior knowledge, a speaker can use the slot provided after ia to supply a description or CHARACTERIZATION, rather than an IDENTIFICATION. He is thus saying, in effect, 'this N' (about which I am going to tell you something relevant) instead of 'this N' (which you are supposed to know about). That is, IDENTIFICATIONS instruct hearers, ' Search in your file to see which one this is'; CHARACTERIZATIONS instruct them, 'Open a file on this N, and put this information in it. ' The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below:
First, however, we must return to the notion of ia as a left-hand or initial bracket, introduced in the discussion of examples 29 ff. As we noted, these examples all involved 'backward-looking' use of the slot after ia, inserting information designed to identify 'which N'. But a deictic marker which has become a potential initial bracket for a parenthetical expression provides another important structural possibility, viz. the 'forward-looking' use of the slot for the insertion of 'new' information. Thus, in using the expression N ia about an item mentioned for the first time, about which hearers may have no prior knowledge, a speaker can use the slot provided after ia to supply a description or CHARACTERIZATION, rather than an IDENTIFICATION. He is thus saying, in effect, 'this N' (about which I am going to tell you something relevant) instead of 'this N' (which you are supposed to know about). That is, IDENTIFICATIONS instruct hearers, ' Search in your file to see which one this is'; CHARACTERIZATIONS instruct them, 'Open a file on this N, and put this information in it. ' The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries In other cases, speakers re-assert that a first identification was correct. This is the function of yes, kanu below: The conversational use to which the information in characterizations is put is quite varied, and does not immediately concern us here. Suffice it to say that one important use is for later identifications. Thus sentence 7 above, re-cited here for convenience, characterizes a newly introduced item, a piece of cloth, as having corn and cassowaries on it: Mama iputim DISFELA ia, [igat kon na muruk samting istap ia] em iputim igo 'Mother put THIS ONE, [which has corn and cassowaries
on IT], she put IT down.' The bracketed material here is not identificational; i.e, 'having corn and cassowaries on it' is not serving to distinguish this cloth from some other piece of cloth. It is obvious from the context and from the 'comma' intonation that the cloth's referent is not in question, and that the description of the pattern on it is simply a characterization. Much later in the same conversation, the speaker uses this characterization identificationally, asking: There has been no previous mention of a knife in the conversation (nor is it mentioned again); and the characterization of it as belonging to 'John's father' (Mr. M.) is not provided in order to help listeners identify it, the specific referent of bus naip being irrelevant. Comparing the syntactic structure of the bracketed material in the examples of characterizations (7, 1, and 38), as we did earlier with identifications, we see once more that there is variation from 'full relatives', like 7 and 1, to genitives, like 38, though we have found no one-word parenthetical expressions analogous to those used in identifications.
We have seen how a demonstrative or deictic ia, postposed to the noun it qualifies, can come to act as a POTENTIAL left-hand bracket in providing a slot for the insertion of a parenthetical expression: potential, because in many cases the referent is clear, there is no identificational work to be done or new information to be inserted, and the possible slot provided after ia is not exploited, as in 25-28. We have not, however, exhausted the structural possibilities of the use of ia in discourse. In particular, we shall see in ?5 that ia provides a slot which is available to all participants in a conversation; thus its analysis bears on problems of discourse sequencing, as well as on those of the organization of information. Lastly, the reader may have noted that we continue to talk about ' ia-bracketing', and even to insert left and right brackets in our transcriptions of examples, though as yet we on IT], she put IT down.' The bracketed material here is not identificational; i.e, 'having corn and cassowaries on it' is not serving to distinguish this cloth from some other piece of cloth. It is obvious from the context and from the 'comma' intonation that the cloth's referent is not in question, and that the description of the pattern on it is simply a characterization. Much later in the same conversation, the speaker uses this characterization identificationally, asking: There has been no previous mention of a knife in the conversation (nor is it mentioned again); and the characterization of it as belonging to 'John's father' (Mr. M.) is not provided in order to help listeners identify it, the specific referent of bus naip being irrelevant. Comparing the syntactic structure of the bracketed material in the examples of characterizations (7, 1, and 38), as we did earlier with identifications, we see once more that there is variation from 'full relatives', like 7 and 1, to genitives, like 38, though we have found no one-word parenthetical expressions analogous to those used in identifications.
We have seen how a demonstrative or deictic ia, postposed to the noun it qualifies, can come to act as a POTENTIAL left-hand bracket in providing a slot for the insertion of a parenthetical expression: potential, because in many cases the referent is clear, there is no identificational work to be done or new information to be inserted, and the possible slot provided after ia is not exploited, as in 25-28. We have not, however, exhausted the structural possibilities of the use of ia in discourse. In particular, we shall see in ?5 that ia provides a slot which is available to all participants in a conversation; thus its analysis bears on problems of discourse sequencing, as well as on those of the organization of information. Lastly, the reader may have noted that we continue to talk about ' ia-bracketing', and even to insert left and right brackets in our transcriptions of examples, though as yet we have provided an analysis only of how ia can come to act as a left-hand or initial bracket. la as a right-hand or terminal bracket is a further problem dealt with in ?5. THAN ONE PARTY) . In ?4, above, we argued that ia, postposed to a particular N, has the basic function of focusing on that N-its deictic force being used to specify THIS N as opposed to some other, or simply to foreground a particular NP among others in the discourse. Its focusing function and its position make it an ideal place, we have argued, for re-identifications, in the case that the first N may somehow be inappropriate, or that its referent may be in some doubt. We showed two examples of this, 29-30, in which speakers replaced an infelicitous first N with another. Such renamings were, however, seen not to be the only way to remedy an unsatisfactory identification, since speakers may use the parenthetical slot after an initial ia to refer to properties of the N, as seen in 31 and 4. In both cases, however, the parenthetical expression served to IDENTIFY the N.
ia IN DISCOURSE (USE BY MORE
In the examples considered so far, potential problems of identification have been dealt with or corrected by the speaker's using the slot after N ia either to rename more appropriately or specifically, as in boi -> Dasti in 29, or in tamberan man -> masalai in 30, or to provide a description which refers back to a previous characterization, as in 31 and 4. But in none of these cases did speakers manifest much doubt about whether hearers were in fact having problems of identification: there was no hesitation, no rising intonation on the ia after the bracketed material, and speakers continued on without interruption (Sacks & Schegloff report parallel findings in such cases). Boi, tamberan man, and man may have been insufficient initial identifications; but the parenthetical material included to clarify or correct was apparently entirely adequate to do the job. In 29, hearers had been told that the boy's name was Dusty because he played in the dust; in 30, the masalai had been discussed at great length; in 31 and 4, the facts that the man was old and had broken his leg had very recently been mentioned, clearly did not apply to any of the other characters in the story, and were almost sure to identify the man uniquely.
In other cases, however, a potential doubt about the adequate identification of an item is evidenced by an ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAN ONE PARTY) . In ?4, above, we argued that ia, postposed to a particular N, has the basic function of focusing on that N-its deictic force being used to specify THIS N as opposed to some other, or simply to foreground a particular NP among others in the discourse. Its focusing function and its position make it an ideal place, we have argued, for re-identifications, in the case that the first N may somehow be inappropriate, or that its referent may be in some doubt. We showed two examples of this, 29-30, in which speakers replaced an infelicitous first N with another. Such renamings were, however, seen not to be the only way to remedy an unsatisfactory identification, since speakers may use the parenthetical slot after an initial ia to refer to properties of the N, as seen in 31 and 4. In both cases, however, the parenthetical expression served to IDENTIFY the N.
In other cases, however, a potential doubt about the adequate identification of an item is evidenced by an ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
ia IN DISCOURSE (USE BY MORE THAN ONE PARTY)
. In ?4, above, we argued that ia, postposed to a particular N, has the basic function of focusing on that N-its deictic force being used to specify THIS N as opposed to some other, or simply to foreground a particular NP among others in the discourse. Its focusing function and its position make it an ideal place, we have argued, for re-identifications, in the case that the first N may somehow be inappropriate, or that its referent may be in some doubt. We showed two examples of this, 29-30, in which speakers replaced an infelicitous first N with another. Such renamings were, however, seen not to be the only way to remedy an unsatisfactory identification, since speakers may use the parenthetical slot after an initial ia to refer to properties of the N, as seen in 31 and 4. In both cases, however, the parenthetical expression served to IDENTIFY the N.
responds with an affective comment (which already indicates that she recognizes the referent). Then Mrs. M., in the course of changing the topic to THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE THE ORIGINS OF SYNTAX IN DISCOURSE
discuss the linguistic abilities of Mrs. Brown, a topic which then continues for some time, renames Brown three times, beginning with Fata (the term usually used for a Catholic priest), replacing it with bingsu (the term for a Lutheran missionary, which Brown is), and replacing this in turn, emphatically, with his name. Each successive try is followed by ia (without question intonation), and by an acknowledgment by Mrs. T.: Here the speaker's rising intonation on ia after vilis 'village' and Mumeng indicates some doubt on her part as to whether it will be adequate to do the job of identification. The hearer, G.S., has asked for specification of the place, and the speaker, N.S., uses two ia-bracketed relative clauses to explain exactly where the place is. As in 40, the hearer's first acknowledgment, 'Mm', is very soft, and the second (here,' Yes') is louder and more assertive. N.S. then finishes the interchange with an emphatic cleft sentence, 'THAT'S where they went and stayed.' Note that there is no rising intonation on either the initial ia after hap 'place' or the ia in the final cleft sentence, a fact which will inform our discussion of the different functions of initial ia and final ia in general.
A Here the speaker's rising intonation on ia after vilis 'village' and Mumeng indicates some doubt on her part as to whether it will be adequate to do the job of identification. The hearer, G.S., has asked for specification of the place, and the speaker, N.S., uses two ia-bracketed relative clauses to explain exactly where the place is. As in 40, the hearer's first acknowledgment, 'Mm', is very soft, and the second (here,' Yes') is louder and more assertive. N.S. then finishes the interchange with an emphatic cleft sentence, 'THAT'S where they went and stayed.' Note that there is no rising intonation on either the initial ia after hap 'place' or the ia in the final cleft sentence, a fact which will inform our discussion of the different functions of initial ia and final ia in general.
A The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for The next example of the use of the slot after ia by a next speaker also extends the analysis in another way. At the end of ?4, we sketched an argument which held that speakers use ia-bracketing not only to provide identifications ('backwardlooking' in the sense that they ask hearers to draw on some information they already have, in order to identify the N), but also to provide initial characterizations of some 'new' N ('forward-looking' in the sense that the slot is used to supply information hearers do not already have). Of course, the information supplied in an initial characterization may later be used parenthetically for identification (another important sense of 'forward-looking'), and initial characterizations may be done in a variety of ways. What is of interest here, however, is that they are often done in exactly the same way as are identifications, i.e. with a parenthetical expression bounded on both sides by ia. We illustrated this in 1, 17, and 38. But whereas in identifications the question of adequacy is always relevant (is the N, and/or the parenthetical material provided, adequate or appropriate for 39-42) , the fact that characterizations provide 'new' information means that very often there is nothing for hearers to acknowledge. How are they to know whether a characterization is 'adequate' until later on, when they find out how it is to be used?
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In some circumstances, however, participants may be able to acknowledge or challenge a characterization. This can happen, e.g., when there are several hearers present, and one or more of them shares the information which the speaker is imparting. Thus characterizations, as well as identifications, can be accomplished jointly (though this is a rarer event).
We mentioned, in discussing the issues of identification involved in 31, that the 'man' in the cowboy movie had already been characterized as ' old', and that the parenthetical material used in the identification was pulled out of the previous characterization. We shall now see how that initial characterization was made, collaboratively, by the three people who have seen the movie and who are jointly recounting it to a group of listeners. Diane G. is the chief narrator; but the two young boys who saw the movie with her, Paul T. and Nat P., pay close attention and interrupt her on a number of occasions (curly braces enclose the whole 'characterizational' transaction): The problem here concerns the proper characterization of John's sidekick, here being mentioned for the first time, and whose name no one seems to remember. Diane initially refers to him as John's 'friend', but immediately inserts (using iabrackets) a parenthetical expression characterizing him as dispela man ia 'this man'. (This may seem completely uninformative as a characterization to the reader unfamiliar with Tok Pisin; but note that the usual meaning of pren is 'friend of the opposite sex, lover'; saying he is a MAN clears up a possible confusion that a girlfriend is the referent.) Paul, who had waited for Diane to provide SOME characterization by not interrupting after the first ia (the initial bracket), now with split-second timing interrupts after Diane's second ia (the terminal bracket), apparently judging her characterization of the second man to be insufficient, and himself provides a characterization of the man as wanpela lapun papa' an old father'. Meanwhile (back at the ranch) Diane has begun to continue her story with tupela 'the two of them', which is overlapped by Paul's wanpela, at which point she desists. Paul continues with lapun 'old' in the clear; but then Nat, anticipating what Paul is going to say, chimes in with papa at the precise time Paul is saying papa-continuing, after Paul has finished, with bilong en 'of his'. Diane recommences, starting to adopt this new characterization of the man as 'John's father', but identification?), giving hearers something to acknowledge (as in 39-42), the fact that characterizations provide 'new' information means that very often there is nothing for hearers to acknowledge. How are they to know whether a characterization is 'adequate' until later on, when they find out how it is to be used? In some circumstances, however, participants may be able to acknowledge or challenge a characterization. This can happen, e.g., when there are several hearers present, and one or more of them shares the information which the speaker is imparting. Thus characterizations, as well as identifications, can be accomplished jointly (though this is a rarer event).
We mentioned, in discussing the issues of identification involved in 31, that the 'man' in the cowboy movie had already been characterized as ' old', and that the parenthetical material used in the identification was pulled out of the previous characterization. We shall now see how that initial characterization was made, collaboratively, by the three people who have seen the movie and who are jointly recounting it to a group of listeners. Diane G. is the chief narrator; but the two young boys who saw the movie with her, Paul T. and Nat P., pay close attention and interrupt her on a number of occasions (curly braces enclose the whole 'characterizational' transaction): -42) , the fact that characterizations provide 'new' information means that very often there is nothing for hearers to acknowledge. How are they to know whether a characterization is 'adequate' until later on, when they find out how it is to be used? In some circumstances, however, participants may be able to acknowledge or challenge a characterization. This can happen, e.g., when there are several hearers present, and one or more of them shares the information which the speaker is imparting. Thus characterizations, as well as identifications, can be accomplished jointly (though this is a rarer event) .
We mentioned, in discussing the issues of identification involved in 31, that the 'man' in the cowboy movie had already been characterized as ' old', and that the parenthetical material used in the identification was pulled out of the previous characterization. We shall now see how that initial characterization was made, collaboratively, by the three people who have seen the movie and who are jointly recounting it to a group of listeners. Diane G. is the chief narrator; but the two young boys who saw the movie with her, Paul T. and Nat P., pay close attention and interrupt her on a number of occasions (curly braces enclose the whole 'characterizational' transaction): (350) state that one of the logical similarities shared by WH-questions, relative clauses, and cleft sentences is that they all 'have a condition given by a sentence S that they impose in some way on the noun phrase separated off from it. Further, they all presuppose that some member of the world satisfies this condition, and are concerned with the member or members which actually DO satisfy the condition.' This is one way of understanding why a focusing particle is such a likely candidate for doing the syntactic work of separating the NP off from the embedded sentence in the three types of constructions, as is true in a number of the languages on which Keenan & Hull present data. But we would argue that this is, in fact, better understood as a property of any parenthetical expression which does identificational work. Use of lapun man ia 'this old man' in 31 presupposes that there is such a member of the world, just as does the embedded relative lek bilong en idai ia 'whose leg was injured' in 4 and the use of the name Dasti in 29. All these cases involve the identification of 'the member or members which actually DO satisfy the condition'.
But not all sentences which use the forms available for doing identificational work in fact use them in this way. Characterizations, e.g., often use ia-brackets, though the work they do is not identificational (cf. sentences 1, 7, and 38). To illustrate with a sentence which was cited earlier, let us reconsider the cleft sentence 21, 'It was an American who gave her her name.' Though, logically, we could say that it is 'presupposed' that someone named the little girl in question, and that the sentence is focusing on 'which member of the world' is the one to have done it, this is in fact not how the sentence functions in the context. Rather, the speaker is attempting to introduce a new topic, and is using this construction for arranging two NEW bits of information: that someone named the child, and that the person was an American. In this case, ia has a clear focusing function; but an analysis of the sentence as locating which member of the world satisfied the 'presupposed' condition is not the most useful way of understanding it.22 In other words, we feel that it can be misleading to use the formal properties of a construction in 22 On related problems of out-of-context discussion of presupposition, see . For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between syntax and information structure, see , especially pp. 203 ff. on 'information focus'. then denies it, returning to her original statement that he is simply John's friend. She closes the material within braces, in which there has been an interaction among all three participants as to the proper characterization of the man, with a final ia, and continues with tupela as she had been doing when interrupted by Paul. Note that what was finally established was that John's friend was a man old enough to be his father, though not his father, but definitely an 'old man' (lapun man), the precise words Diane later uses to identify him in ex. 31.
Like Keenan & Hull, we have rejected a strictly syntactic view of relative clauses, in order to show some of the properties which relative clauses share with other constructions. But whereas their analysis is based on a study of isolated sentences from a logical and semantic perspective, ours examines sequences of utterances within a discourse context, trying to understand how the relevant construction types are actually used in the exchange of information. Thus Keenan & Hull (350) state that one of the logical similarities shared by WH-questions, relative clauses, and cleft sentences is that they all 'have a condition given by a sentence S that they impose in some way on the noun phrase separated off from it. Further, they all presuppose that some member of the world satisfies this condition, and are concerned with the member or members which actually DO satisfy the condition.' This is one way of understanding why a focusing particle is such a likely candidate for doing the syntactic work of separating the NP off from the embedded sentence in the three types of constructions, as is true in a number of the languages on which Keenan & Hull present data. But we would argue that this is, in fact, better understood as a property of any parenthetical expression which does identificational work. Use of lapun man ia 'this old man' in 31 presupposes that there is such a member of the world, just as does the embedded relative lek bilong en idai ia 'whose leg was injured' in 4 and the use of the name Dasti in 29. All these cases involve the identification of 'the member or members which actually DO satisfy the condition'.
But not all sentences which use the forms available for doing identificational work in fact use them in this way. Characterizations, e.g., often use ia-brackets, though the work they do is not identificational (cf. sentences 1, 7, and 38). To illustrate with a sentence which was cited earlier, let us reconsider the cleft sentence 21, 'It was an American who gave her her name.' Though, logically, we could say that it is 'presupposed' that someone named the little girl in question, and that the sentence is focusing on 'which member of the world' is the one to have done it, this is in fact not how the sentence functions in the context. Rather, the speaker is attempting to introduce a new topic, and is using this construction for arranging two NEW bits of information: that someone named the child, and that the person was an American. In this case, ia has a clear focusing function; but an analysis of the sentence as locating which member of the world satisfied the 'presupposed' condition is not the most useful way of understanding it.22 In other words, we feel that it can be misleading to use the formal properties of a construction in then denies it, returning to her original statement that he is simply John's friend. She closes the material within braces, in which there has been an interaction among all three participants as to the proper characterization of the man, with a final ia, and continues with tupela as she had been doing when interrupted by Paul. Note that what was finally established was that John's friend was a man old enough to be his father, though not his father, but definitely an 'old man' (lapun man), the precise words Diane later uses to identify him in ex. 31.
But not all sentences which use the forms available for doing identificational work in fact use them in this way. Characterizations, e.g., often use ia-brackets, though the work they do is not identificational (cf. sentences 1, 7, and 38). To illustrate with a sentence which was cited earlier, let us reconsider the cleft sentence 21, 'It was an American who gave her her name.' Though, logically, we could say that it is 'presupposed' that someone named the little girl in question, and that the sentence is focusing on 'which member of the world' is the one to have done it, this is in fact not how the sentence functions in the context. Rather, the speaker is attempting to introduce a new topic, and is using this construction for arranging two NEW bits of information: that someone named the child, and that the person was an American. In this case, ia has a clear focusing function; but an analysis of the sentence as locating which member of the world satisfied the 'presupposed' condition is not the most useful way of understanding it.22 In other words, we feel that it can be misleading to use the formal properties of a construction in
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arguing about its possible function, the understanding of which is more readily observed from the uses to which it is put.
It should come as no surprise that a focusing particle like ia is not specific to the three syntactic types discussed by Keenan & Hull, but that its use is governed by discourse considerations dealing with the structuring of information exchange. In analysing how ia is actually used, we have seen that, for speakers and hearers, 'presupposition' is often problematic, and that the structures which seem to be built for dealing with presupposition (in our terms, determining whether or not the bracketed material is adequate or appropriate for identification or characterization) contain the mechanisms necessary for the interactional negotiation of these problems. Thus, in some cases, speakers manifest doubt about whether hearers will be able to identify a particular N, either by using a rising intonation on the ia which follows it (the first or left-hand bracketing ia), as in 39, and/or by adding one or more identificational expressions after it. A rising intonation on the ia following such an expression (the second, or later ia) is also not at all uncommon, as speakers use it to check whether the identification or characterization given has been sufficient (cf. also Sacks & Schegloff). But note that such a right-hand or 'terminal' ia is only potentially terminal: if the identification or characterization still turns out to be insufficient, the speaker may well continue to provide further information, and each potentially terminal ia then also marks the slot at which a new parenthetical expression can begin. Further, the system provides an opening for a next speaker to use the slot, whether to question or correct the identification or characterization, to confirm that it has been understood, or to provide further information for a third party.
We saw earlier that left-hand or initial ia is also only potentially so, since an N may be tagged with ia (usually with emphatic or fading intonation) and nothing more. But this (potential initial) ia may also receive a rising intonation, when there is doubt about the identification of the referent. Any ia (with rising intonation or not; potentially initial or potentially terminal) can mark a slot where hearers can question or acknowledge, and where either present speaker or a next speaker can provide a parenthetical expression; but most identifications and initial characterizations are limited to one such expression. Thus ia occurring after any such expression is very likely to be serving as a terminal bracket, functioning to announce to hearers that the parenthetical expression is over, and that what follows belongs to the matrix or higher sentence.
AN INITIAL VIEW OF THE PLACEMENT OF ia WITH RESPECT TO RELATIVE CLAUSES
AND CLEFT SENTENCES. We indicated in ??1-3 that some relative clauses and cleft sentences do not use ia-bracketing; i.e., they lack either initial ia, or final ia, or both. We shall now attempt to use what we have learned about the wider functions of ia, in deixis and in discourse, to understand those cases in which ia is not used. Our analysis treats as crucial the deictic or focusing function of ia, the different roles of ia as an initial and final bracket, and the question of word order in syntax. Table 1 presents the 112 relative clauses and cleft sentences we have considered according to the syntactic position of the head noun in the matrix sentence, and the presence or absence of initial and final ia. The 19 place relatives are not included arguing about its possible function, the understanding of which is more readily observed from the uses to which it is put.
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The frequent use of initial ia in cleft sentences can best be explained as concerning the focusing function of ia. The preposing of the noun to which ia attaches is one way of topicalizing; and many such sentences are said very emphatically, the specific referent being vigorously contrasted with another possible candidate. Indeed, as in 18-20 above, speakers often use cleft sentences in correcting misidentifications by a previous speaker. We will repeat only partial glosses: (18) 'it's the YOUNGER brother' (previous speaker had thought the elder brother was being discussed). .' In neither case is the speaker correcting a misidentification; but there are, of course, many cleft sentences using ia which also do not correct misidentifications, e.g. 21, which we discussed in ?5, in connection with presupposition.
The five remaining cleft sentences that use neither ia nor any other focusing particle to separate the preposed noun from the following embedded sentence seem to rely on intonation and word order (the preposing itself) to accomplish this separation, and are not otherwise analytically distinct from the cleft sentences using ia. Examples are: Before returning to a consideration of why right-hand or final ia is rather infrequent in cleft sentences, as well as to a discussion of the other cases of Table 1 , it is important to re-examine in greater depth the distinction made in ?5 between IDENTIFICATIONS and CHARACTERIZATIONS.
7. MORE ON IDENTIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERIZATIONS. In ?4 we stated that any N having a definite, specific referent can have ia postposed to it, which can in turn be followed by a parenthetical expression. We distinguished IDENTIFICATION, where the parenthetical expression (whether a re-identification or a description) asks hearers to search to identify a specific referent already known to them, from CHARACTERIZATION, where the N used has a definite, specific referent, but where hearers are not asked to identify it-the slot after ia being used to provide a The frequent use of initial ia in cleft sentences can best be explained as concerning the focusing function of ia. The preposing of the noun to which ia attaches is one way of topicalizing; and many such sentences are said very emphatically, the specific referent being vigorously contrasted with another possible candidate. Indeed, as in 18-20 above, speakers often use cleft sentences in correcting misidentifications by a previous speaker. We will repeat only partial glosses: (18) 'it's the YOUNGER brother' (previous speaker had thought the elder brother was being discussed). .' In neither case is the speaker correcting a misidentification; but there are, of course, many cleft sentences using ia which also do not correct misidentifications, e.g. 21, which we discussed in ?5, in connection with presupposition.
7. MORE ON IDENTIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERIZATIONS. In ?4 we stated that any N having a definite, specific referent can have ia postposed to it, which can in turn be followed by a parenthetical expression. We distinguished IDENTIFICATION, where the parenthetical expression (whether a re-identification or a description) asks hearers to search to identify a specific referent already known to them, from CHARACTERIZATION, where the N used has a definite, specific referent, but where hearers are not asked to identify it-the slot after ia being used to provide a The frequent use of initial ia in cleft sentences can best be explained as concerning the focusing function of ia. The preposing of the noun to which ia attaches is one way of topicalizing; and many such sentences are said very emphatically, the specific referent being vigorously contrasted with another possible candidate. Indeed, as in 18-20 above, speakers often use cleft sentences in correcting misidentifications by a previous speaker. We will repeat only partial glosses: (18) 'it's the YOUNGER brother' (previous speaker had thought the elder brother was being discussed). Before returning to a consideration of why right-hand or final ia is rather infrequent in cleft sentences, as well as to a discussion of the other cases of Table 1 , it is important to re-examine in greater depth the distinction made in ?5 between IDENTIFICATIONS and CHARACTERIZATIONS.
7. MORE ON IDENTIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERIZATIONS. In ?4 we stated that any N having a definite, specific referent can have ia postposed to it, which can in turn be followed by a parenthetical expression. We distinguished IDENTIFICATION, where the parenthetical expression (whether a re-identification or a description) asks hearers to search to identify a specific referent already known to them, from CHARACTERIZATION, where the N used has a definite, specific referent, but where hearers are not asked to identify it-the slot after ia being used to provide a characterization which is often 'forward-looking' in that it will later be used for identification. Though the information states of hearers differ radically in the two cases (cf. Goffman 1974: 133-4, 506-8), we argued in ?4 that, in both identifications and characterizations, referents are definite and specific from the speaker's point of view, and therefore can have ia attached to them. (It is important to note that many relatives qualify neither as identifications nor as characterizations; but we shall postpone a discussion of this until ?8.)
The distinction between identification and characterization is based mainly on the work done by the parenthetical expression. We noted that IDENTIFICATIONAL expressions use information presumably known to hearers (whether a renaming or a description),25 to identify specifically one of two things: (a) an item that has been mentioned and characterized earlier in the same conversation; or (b) an item that is being mentioned for the first time here, but that hearers can uniquely identify from prior knowledge. A classic example of the first sub-type (which abounds in story-telling) was the man 'whose leg was injured' in 4, the man having been so characterized earlier in the same conversation. The second type is much less common, and also poses a number of analytical difficulties-because, although the parenthetical expression does function principally to identify the item, it is also often serving simultaneously as a characterization of the item for purposes of the present conversation. One fairly clear case is the excerpt cited as 41 above, in which N.S. identifies a hap 'place' mentioned for the first time in this conversation, but which she assumes is already known to the hearer, and her two parenthetical expressions seek to enable G.S. to identify it specifically. Another example is: Wanpela men ia 'this woman' is here being mentioned for the first time; but Mrs. M.'s parenthetical expression, 'our boss's wife', does indeed seek to identify her specifically. (The hearer in this case had seen the boss's wife, but did not know her personally-and so would not have recognized her name.) And though the parenthetical expression could in some sense be said to provide an initial characterization of the woman, the information which Mrs. M. uses to identify her later in the discourse is the fact that she was pregnant. In both examples, then, the identificational function is primary. A similar distinction can be made with respect to parenthetical expressions which provide characterizations. Here the work done by the parenthetical expression is that of providing new information about the N it qualifies; but it may characterize a new N being introduced for the first time, or it may tell hearers something new about an N whose referent has already been clearly identified (in 25 ' Presumably' here is an inference about the function of the parenthetical material provided by speakers. In such expressions, speakers seem to supply material which will be adequate to the job of identification, and which we can therefore suppose that THEY PRESUME will work, i.e. be known to hearers. If it does not work, of course, speakers can 'recycle', recursively, with a further, again 'presumably known' parenthetical expression. characterization which is often 'forward-looking' in that it will later be used for identification. Though the information states of hearers differ radically in the two cases (cf. Goffman 1974: 133-4, 506-8), we argued in ?4 that, in both identifications and characterizations, referents are definite and specific from the speaker's point of view, and therefore can have ia attached to them. (It is important to note that many relatives qualify neither as identifications nor as characterizations; but we shall postpone a discussion of this until ?8.)
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8. CONSTRAINTS ON ia-BRACKETING. We are now in a position to see why identifications (both sub-types) are more likely than characterizations to be truly 'parenthetical', i.e. to have some material in the same sentence occurring AFTER the parenthetical expression. In 'topic-comment' terms, both cleft sentences and characterizations use the slot after initial ia to make a comment about the preceding N; but this is not the case with identificational parentheticals, which occur in sentences which make their comments elsewhere (either before or after the parenthetical expression). Cleft sentences, on the other hand, usually consist only of the preposed-topic N and the embedded-sentence comment; thus there is no need to separate the embedded sentence from any following material. And characterizations have a parenthetical structure only when the sentence in which they occur makes two comments, the first 'parenthetical'-as in 50, where we are told both that the dog had black ears and that Elena was afraid of it. Most, however, are like 52 in containing a single comment, and thus no relative clause.
The fact that the embeddings attached to head nouns in oblique cases and those in cleft sentences are virtually always coterminous with the end of the sentence (we found only one exception, in an oblique case) is what makes them so unlikely to have a final ia. There is no following material from which they need to mark a separation. (A pause or other intonational mark will usually indicate separation from the succeeding sentence.) Initial ia, however, has an important focusing function in cleft sentences. In oblique cases, ia may carry extra weight in view of the greater complexity which usually characterizes such sentences (e.g., most have both a direct and an indirect object); and surface marking of the embedding probably makes them easier to parse.27 This greater importance of initial ia as opposed to final ia appears to constitute a specific illustration of Goffman's suggestion (1974:255-6) that:
26 Though only non-restrictive relatives have traditionally been considered 'appositive' (cf., e.g., Langendoen 1969:148-9), many of the parenthetical expressions we have been discussing appear to be both 'restrictive' in function and 'appositive' in form. This is the case for renamings, as well as for some 'descriptive' parentheticals (whether full relatives or not). them something relevant about it (they may, of course, be expected to use this information in making a later identification). Thus in the two sub-types of 'characterizations', hearers are simply told certain 'new' facts, possibly additional facts, about a particular N. In both cases, these correspond to some extent to appositive or non-restrictive relative clauses, in that the information they contain does not function to identify or restrict the universe of possible referents of the N to which they are attached.26 However, in recharacterizations they do not do the work of identification, because the referent of the N is already totally obvious; and in characterizations of new N's, they cannot identify the referent, because the N in question is completely new to hearers.
26 Though only non-restrictive relatives have traditionally been considered 'appositive' (cf., e.g., Langendoen 1969:148-9), many of the parenthetical expressions we have been discussing appear to be both 'restrictive' in function and 'appositive' in form. This is the case for renamings, as well as for some 'descriptive' parentheticals (whether full relatives or not). 
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the bracket initiating a particular kind of activity may carry more significance than the bracket terminating it. For ... the beginning bracket not only will establish an episode but also will establish a slot for signals which will inform and define what sort of transformation is to be made of the materials within the episode ... Closing brackets seem to perform less work, perhaps reflecting the fact that it is probably much easier on the whole to terminate the influence of a frame than to establish it.
In this case, the use made of the bracketed materials can involve identification or characterization, and can apply to an N which may or may not be meant to be initially recognized; the 'informing signals' include intonation on both the N and initial ia. Closing or terminal ia, on the other hand, can function to confirm an identification emphatically, simply to separate the embedded material from the continuing sentence, or (usually with rising intonation) to do double duty as a potential initial ia for a new parenthetical expression.
It is clear from Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Table 3 (p. 658).
The 'definite-indefinite' distinction drawn here is not syntactically defined (though it has syntactic consequences with respect to ia-placement). For example, the bracket initiating a particular kind of activity may carry more significance than the bracket terminating it. For ... the beginning bracket not only will establish an episode but also will establish a slot for signals which will inform and define what sort of transformation is to be made of the materials within the episode ... Closing brackets seem to perform less work, perhaps reflecting the fact that it is probably much easier on the whole to terminate the influence of a frame than to establish it.
In this case, the use made of the bracketed materials can involve identification or characterization, and can apply to an N which may or may not be meant to be initially recognized; the 'informing signals' include intonation on both the N and initial ia. Closing or terminal ia, on the other hand, can function to confirm an identification emphatically, simply to separate the embedded material from the continuing sentence, or (usually with rising intonation) to do double duty as a potential initial ia for a new parenthetical expression. It is clear from Table 1 that terminal ia is less frequent in our data than initial ia (46 cases vs. 55 cases). Table 2 indicates that the favored environment for missing final ia is at the end of embeddings which are coterminous with the end of the matrix sentence. Of the 49 sentences in which the matrix sentence continues after the embedding, half do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Where the matrix sentence does not continue after the embedding, two-thirds (42 out of 63 sentences) do not mark the end of the embedding with ia. Table 2 also shows that there are 24 sentences in which the matrix sentence does continue after the embedding, but which are not marked with final ia. Of these, 18 are also missing initial ia, and the majority of them have special discourse characteristics which will be discussed below. The remaining six again seem to rely on word order and intonation to clarify the syntax. Two examples are: In both these cases, the parenthetical material is said very rapidly and in an undertone, and the following matrix sentence recommences in a louder, more emphatic style. Once more, we observe variation with respect to pronoun-copying after the parenthetical expression; 54 repeats the subject pronoun em, while 55 deletes it. Lastly, we come to the problem of missing initial ia. The first constraint of importance here is related to discourse considerations: with only one exception, ia does not attach to N's whose referents are indefinite, as shown in Table 3 (p. 658).
The 'definite-indefinite' distinction drawn here is not syntactically defined (though it has syntactic consequences with respect to ia-placement). For example,
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between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly. To return briefly to an issue raised in ?1, regarding the interaction between iabracketing and Equi-NP Deletion, it would at first glance appear that ia-bracketing acts as a constraint on the alternation between deletion and pronominalization of the coreferential NP. Of the 40 sentences in Table 1 in which ia-bracketing is not used, 80% delete the pronoun, as opposed to only 60% of the 72 sentences in which some form of ia-bracketing is employed. This, however, is entirely due to the presence of the 21 indefinites in the 'unmarked' category, since deletion is almost categorical in these sentences, only one of them retaining a coreferential pronoun in the embedded sentence. Of the 19 remaining unmarked sentences, 63% delete the pronoun; i.e., deletion occurs with the same frequency as in the ia-bracketed sentences. between one and 15. The relatively low number of sentences per speaker (a problem endemic to studies of variability in syntax) makes it difficult to discern differences among speakers; however, most display variable usage, alternating among the various possibilities we have discussed (double ia, initial ia only, final ia only, no ia). Only one speaker (Tony T.) has an inordinately high ratio of sentences unmarked by ia (8 out of 11, with one each of the other three types), but four of the eight unmarked sentences are indefinites. Grouping the speakers in various ways, we found a slight tendency for women to use ia-bracketing more frequently than men (72% vs. 56%), and for children to use it more than adults (75% vs. 60%). We would not claim that these differences are significant, given the sampling error inherent in having relatively few sentences per speaker, and we find it remarkable that speakers behaved so similarly.
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demonstrative ia is also attested in the texts and examples cited by Wurm, , and Mihalic 1957 .
Our reconstruction follows simply from this historical account. That is, we propose three stages: (1) the original 'place adverb' ia; (2) extension for use as a postposed deictic or demonstrative; and (3) further extension for general 'bracketing' use, including topic-comment structures, relativization, and cleft sentences. That these uses are semantically and functionally related has been shown in ??4-8.
We can now relate this development to the creolization process. First, we know that the existence of creole speakers of Tok Pisin in any significant numbers can be dated no earlier than the mid-1950's; and we have five clear cases of ia-marked relatives attested from more than a decade earlier. Certainly there is no reason why fluent second-language speakers of Tok Pisin could not have made the transfer between stages 2 and 3 in the use of ia. That they indeed did so is confirmed by the adults in our sample, who have this usage well established in their speech and have not learned it from their children.31 This is particularly likely not only because of the semantic and functional relationships among the three usages, but also because many Austronesian languages of the New Guinea and island Melanesian area show striking parallels.
Thus, in Buang,32 the deictic particle ken is used as a place adverbial, e.g. ke mdo ken 'I'm staying here'; as a postposed demonstrative, e.g. ke mdo byay ken 'I'm staying in this house'; and as a relativizer, e.g. ke mdo byay ken gu le vkev 'I'm staying in the house that you saw yesterday'. Ray 1926 provides some evidence for similar structures in a number of island Melanesian languages, including Iai (p. 89), Nguna (208), Tasiko (237), Uripiv (286), and Tangoa (360). As for Tok Pisin's contemporary 'sister' languages, Bislama appears to use ia as a postposed deictic marker, sometimes in conjunction with its relativizer we (cf. Camden and fn. 11 above); and in the Solomon Islands, ia has been described as a 'particle which refers back to, e.g. desfala man ia' (SICA, n.d., p. 13).33 31 Some of the young adults in our sample had no children older than infants. We do not, of course, mean to imply that children's most important input to language learning comes from their parents (or vice versa, in a creolizing situation!) We believe that the creolization process can shed much light on various problems of language universals (cf. Traugott 1973, Slobin 1975), though we do not agree with Bickerton's assertion (1974:127) that this view necessarily implies that 'adults have readier access than children to linguistic universals.' Taking a somewhat wider view of linguistic universals than simply how linguistic universals may relate to 'specific neural properties of the human brain' (Bickerton, 135), we also feel it important to understand how linguistic means are shaped by their situation within, and relation to, the communicative patterns of human societies (cf. Hymes 1971). We therefore agree with Bickerton that close study of the particular social circumstances of both pidginization and creolization is necessary for the solution of these problems. (Cf. Sankoff, MSS a, b, for further analysis of the social and historical situation of Tok Pisin in New Guinea.) 32 Buang is an Austronesian language spoken in the Morobe District south of Lae, and studied by Sankoff. Bruce Hooley, who has done extensive research on another dialect of Buang (where the cognate for ken is sen) has confirmed these examples. Hooley (personal communication) has correctly pointed out that Buang relatives usually, but not invariably, have a closing particle other than ken (or sen), one of a set of deictic forms. 33 We thank Aletta Biersack for bringing this to our attention.
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